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There are two non-mutually exclusive theories of  individual variations in pro-
capitalism opinions. The first theory views pro-capitalism opinions as self-serving:
Individuals are opposed to market forces when they threaten their economic rents. The
second theory views differences in such opinions as reflecting genuine disagreement
on the efficiency of  various economic systems. Using individual data, we investigate
the validity of  both theories, focusing on attitudes toward private ownership, private
profit and competition. We find evidence that the first theory explains some of  the
variations in attitudes. However, consistent with the second theory, we also find
evidence of  individual learning about the comparative virtues of  economic systems.
The learning is slow, home-biased and path-dependent. Long-run cultural and
historical determinants of  pro-market attitudes, such as religion and legal origins,
explain more than 40% of  the cross-country variations in capitalism aversion. Last,
we provide tentative evidence that at the country level, pro-market opinions affect
the nature of  economic institutions. Our results suggest that the feasibility of  eco-
nomic reform does not depend solely on its impact on the distribution of  rents; ide-
ological 
 
a-prioris
 
 are likely to be important as well.
— Augustin Landier, David Thesmar and Mathias Thoenig
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1. INTRODUCTION
 
Since at least Adam Smith, a key message of  classical economics is that the appetite
for profits of  entrepreneurs competing on a free market is a powerful tool for reaching
an efficient allocation of  resources in the economy. Although very few economists
would argue that business does not require any regulation, a consensus exists that, in
many instances, competition and the quest for profit can be harnessed for the common
good. Yet, people’s attitudes toward the virtues of  free markets vary widely across
countries. According to the World Value Survey (WVS), only 22.1% of  the French
believe that ‘the owners should run their business and appoint their managers’, while
as much as 58.7% of  the Americans would agree with this statement. These differences
are surprising for countries with similar levels of  economic development and not so
different political institutions. We believe that the persistence of  such a dispersion in
pro-market attitudes calls for a thorough study of  its determinants. In this paper, we
investigate why some countries are more capitalism averse than others.
We test two alternative theories of  opinion formation: the ‘self  interest’ hypothesis,
whereby agents express attitudes that are self-serving vis-à-vis their individual vested
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interests, and the ‘slow learning’ hypothesis, whereby different opinions reflect genuine
disagreement about the relative aggregate effects of  economic systems. According to
the first theory, agents favour reforms that maximize their individual wealth given
their current status in the system in place; if  their status changed, they would change
their view on the desirability of  reforms accordingly. In the second theory, an agent’s
opinion reflects foremost ideological views on the aggregate welfare which agents
would not instantaneously revise if  their status in society was changed. In this case,
beliefs are likely to be path-dependent and shaped by national history: This does not
require that agents be irrational, but simply that their information set is limited and/or
that learning about economics is costly.
These two alternative theories have been formulated in Acemoglu (2003) and more
informally in Robinson (1998). Acemoglu (2003) describes them as the two alternative
explanations for why a ‘Political Coase Theorem’ might not hold empirically. In
his paper, Acemoglu explains that there are only two types of  explanations for
why inefficient economic systems are adopted by societies: Either vested interests
combined with incomplete contracts prevent the reach of  a Pareto-efficient outcome
(theory 1) or these different choices reflect genuine disagreement on what system is
efficient (theory 2).
Distinguishing between these two views is, we believe, crucial for the optimization
of  economic reform packages: If  a pro-market reform faces hostility for the first
reason, the crucial task for a reformist government is to make sure that a large
enough constituency benefits from the reform, for example by coupling it with a
redistributive package that makes sure individuals get compensated for the rents
destroyed by the reform (as suggested by Delpla and Wyplosz, 2007). In other words,
appropriate and credible transfer programmes would make the ‘Political Coase The-
orem’ hold in this economy (Acemoglu, 2003). However, if  a reform faces hostility for
the second reason, the task of  the reformist government is to use pedagogy and to
make sure that information about the positive effect of  similar reforms in other
countries are available to the public in an accessible and credible form. A remark in
a conference discussion by development economist Kausjik Basu (1992) illustrates
concretely why distinguishing both theories is important for political reformers:
 
Attempts to remove such a subsidy [to fertilizers in India] have turned out to be politically
impossible and the majority of  those opposing the removal do so not because they are
themselves adversely affected by it (as public choice theory suggests) but because they believe
that removing the subsidy will be bad for the economy.
 
To test these two competing hypotheses, we use individual level data from the
WVS, and focus on attitudes towards competition and private profits. First, we find
some evidence that opinions expressed by individuals on different economic systems
are ‘self  serving’ (i.e. reflect the selfish interest of  these individuals), which is the
assumption prevailing in most political economy models. Using an approach akin to
the difference in difference methodology used in experimental setting, we find that
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agents with more financial wealth tend to express more support for ‘private profit’.
However, though significant, these effects are small in magnitude and leave most of
the dispersion of  beliefs unexplained.
We then explore the second theory (the ‘slow learning’ view) and find that learning
about the comparative virtues of  economic system is slow, and largely affected by
history. We find that generations that have been exposed to massive doses of  planning
tend to underestimate the benefits of  free market. Using the post-communist transi-
tion as a natural experiment, we find differences that are sizeable, quantitatively. We
finally find that citizens tend to attribute economic outcomes to the system in place
in their country: faced with a positive growth shock, pro-market opinions become
relatively stronger in countries that have pro-market institutions.
Such evidence of  slow learning suggests that, in the cross-section of  countries,
opinions are unlikely to converge fast and therefore are determined by long-run
history. Yet, it says little about why such differences emerged in the first place. We
therefore investigate cultural and historical determinants of  the cross-section of
pro-capitalism attitudes. Building on previous literature, we focus on trust, religion
and legal origins. Trust is uncorrelated with opinions, while religion and legal origins
explain more than 40% of  the cross country variation in attitudes.
Finally we discuss some implications for economic policy by investigating whether
pro-market attitudes (at least in democracies) matter for the feasibility of  economic
reforms. We provide some tentative evidence that aggregate economic opinions indeed
correlate strongly with the type of  economic institutions adopted by each country.
There is an emerging literature which seeks to understand opinions about the
relative merits of  economic systems. Our paper contributes to it by shifting the focus
on attitudes toward competition and private profits. Borne by a large political econ-
omy literature, recent academic work has mostly studied attitudes toward
redistribution
 
1
 
 and towards free trade.
 
2
 
 In a recent book, Alesina 
 
et al.
 
 (2001) have
asked why the welfare state is larger in Europe than in the United States. Surprisingly
– at least for economists – they find very little support for traditional, political
economy based, explanations. Given the higher volatility and inequality of  the US
economy, the United States should redistribute more, not less than Europe. Thus, the
authors move away from a pure economic explanation and go as far as suggesting
that some specificities of  US history – a large country, ethnic heterogeneity, the early
emancipation of  the Supreme Court – have endowed modern American citizens with
persistent anti-redistributive beliefs.
Very few papers have sought to understand the attitudes toward competition and
for-profit motive, the two dimensions that we focus on in the present article. Di Tella
 
et al.
 
 (2007) show that squatters in Buenos Aires who were randomly allocated the
 
1
 
See also Alesina and Laferrara (2000), Luttmer (2001), Alesina 
 
et al.
 
 (2001) and Alesina and Fuchs (2007).
 
2
 
See for instance O’Rourke and Sinott (2001a) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) on free trade; Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and
Sinott (2006) on immigration.
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ownership of  their homes adopted more materialistic and individualistic beliefs.
Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2004) argue that people in poor countries tend not to elect
pro-capitalism parties because they perceive such platforms as benefiting mostly to
rich capitalists. Closer to us is Guiso 
 
et al.
 
 (2003b), who look at the correlation
between religious beliefs and several economic attitudes – in particular vis-à-vis
competition but also inequality, thrift etc. A main difference with our paper is that
we explore a wider range of  determinants, such as political economy ones, but also
behavioral or historical ones, that they do not investigate in their study.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 exposes our conceptual background.
Section 3 describes the dataset we use. In Section 4 we test the ‘self-interest’ view,
whereby individual express self-serving opinions about economic systems. In Section
5, we test the ‘slow learning’ hypothesis, which posits that learning about the relative
merits of  competition and private property of  firms is imperfect and highly path
dependent. Section 6 analyses some cross-country determinants of  pro-capitalism
attitudes which relate to culture and past history. Section 7 explores whether pro-
market opinions affect the feasibility of  economic reforms. Section 8 concludes.
 
2. WHAT DETERMINES PRO-CAPITALISM ATTITUDES? TWO HYPOTHESES
 
Following Acemoglu (2003) and Robinson (1998) we distinguish two types of  deter-
minants of  attitudes about private ownership of  firms, which arise from two distinct
– yet non-mutually exclusive – theories of  the formation of  economic opinions. One
first theory contends that each individual supports the system that maximizes his or
her utility given his/her initial endowment in physical human and social capital. This
assumption is at the root of  most political economy models, who assume that agents
vote in line with their interests. We label this view the ‘self  interest hypothesis’.
One other possibility is that agents selflessly form beliefs about what is optimal
from the society viewpoint. In this case attitudes would not reflect redistributive
concerns but rather differences in opinions about the aggregate consequences of
different economic systems. To take an example, some individuals might believe that
‘free markets’ maximize total economic surplus while others believe that markets are
erratic, prone to bubbles, and that a large level of  government intervention is required
to ‘rationalize’ the economy. If  such beliefs were formed rationally, they would be the
same all over the world, so it must be the case that the process of  belief  formation
over-weights local experience and history, that beliefs are somewhat ‘sticky’. We will
thus refer to such theory as the ‘slow learning hypothesis’.
 
2.1. The main econometric framework
 
None of  these views is easy to test with aggregate data, mostly because of  endogeneity
concerns. Indeed, if  economic institutions adopted by a country result from the
population’s average belief, we will not be able to test how economic rents determine
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beliefs without looking at individuals with different characteristics 
 
within
 
 countries.
This is why we will use individual level data on attitudes from the WVS.
Fortunately, for reasons that will become clearer below, both views give a central
role to institutions. Under the ‘self-interest hypothesis’, economic institutions shape
the redistributive circuit, and determine individual support for a given policy. Under
the ‘slow learning hypothesis’, institutions are the legacy of  history and collective
experience, and as a result, impact current beliefs.
Both types of  theories predict that the link between individual attitudes and indi-
vidual characteristics (such as age, education) will be 
 
different
 
 depending on the insti-
tutional background. Thus, the attitude 
 
att
 
ict
 
 of  individual 
 
i
 
, living in country 
 
c
 
, at date
 
t
 
, should satisfy the following type of  equation:
 
att
 
ict
 
 = 
 
α
 
c
 
 + 
 
δ
 
t
 
 + 
 
β
 
·
 
C
 
it
 
 
 
×
 
 
 
Z
 
c
 
 + 
 
γ
 
·
 
X
 
it
 
 + 
 
ε
 
ict
 
(1)
where 
 
α
 
c
 
 is a country fixed effect, 
 
δ
 
t
 
 a temporal effect and 
 
ε
 
ict
 
 an error term. 
 
X
 
it
 
represents various individual characteristics (such as age, gender, education etc.).
 
C
 
it
 
 is one particular characteristic (say, age), whose impact on attitude is affected by
the institutional background. 
 
Z
 
c
 
 is the dimension of  country level institutions which
is supposed to matter.
As we will see below, ‘self  interest’ and ‘slow learning’ theories of  belief  formation
have specific predictions on the sign of  
 
β
 
 (for different variables 
 
C
 
it
 
 and 
 
Z
 
c
 
). Because
we look at interaction terms, this approach is akin to 
 
difference-in-difference
 
 estimators
used to evaluate the effect of  natural experiments. To see this analogy more intuitively,
think of  two countries, A and B. In country A, institutions are such that, say, left-handed
people (individual characteristic
 
 C
 
it
 
) have access to high-wage government jobs (country-
specific institution Z
 
A
 
), while in country B, such privileges do not exist. The interac-
tion term 
 
β
 
 measures whether, compared to the right-handed, left-handed people are
more ‘pro-government’ in country A than in country B (as the self-serving view would
predict). In the language of  ‘diff-in-diff ’ estimation, the ‘treated group’ is the left-
handed, the ‘control-group’ is the right-handed, and we compare differences in the
attitudes of  both groups after treatment (country A) and without treatment (country B)
which isolates the effect of  the treatment (the institutional difference between both
countries) on individual attitudes. The advantage of  this approach is that it provides
an identification that is still valid even if: (i) the left-handed were intrinsically more
pro-government than the right-handed; or (ii) 
 
all
 
 citizens of  one country were on
average more pro-government than in the other for some other reason than the treatment;
or (iii) there were a larger fraction of  left-handed in one country versus the other.
Using Equation (1) to test the predictions of  both theories is therefore a powerful
test: It alleviates endogeneity concerns by using individual level data, but also allows
controlling for country specific effects. Thus, our tests do not rest on interpreting in
a causal way the correlation between country characteristics and typical attitudes.
We now turn to the exact content that both ‘self  interest’ and ‘slow learning’
hypotheses give to the variables of  Equation (1).
 472 AUGUSTIN LANDIER, DAVID THESMAR AND MATHIAS THOENIG
 
2.2. The ‘self-interest hypothesis’
 
The ‘self  interest hypothesis’ has provided the underpinnings of  most existing studies
on economic attitudes. For instance, there has been a long tradition, since at least
Metzler and Richard (1981), in the political economy literature, arguing that individual
demand for redistribution depends on one’s income compared to the average income
(what one would have if  aggregate income was shared with perfect equality). Poorer
than average people support redistribution, and more unequal societies are more
likely to vote for redistribution. This theory, however, does poorly at explaining why
the United States does not have a European-like welfare state (Alesina 
 
et al.
 
, 2001).
Studies of  attitudes toward free trade are much more consistent with the self-
interest hypothesis. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that, in developed countries, it is
unskilled workers, and those who are working for highly exposed industries (whose
sector specific human capital is the most at risk), who are the least supportive of  free
trade. This is consistent with the redistributive effects of  free trade. In her study of
attitudes toward immigration, Mayda (2006) finds that people with a high level of
education or with a high level of  income are the most favourable to (unskilled) immi-
gration. Such evidence is consistent with what a standard Hecksher-Ohlin model
would predict, where the rich and the skilled benefit more from globalization.
Hereafter we explore pro-market attitudes, that is, opinions about whether firms
should indeed compete and seek to maximize profits. In political economy theory,
two recent papers (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perrotti and Von Thadden, 2006) suggest
that investor protection is the result of  a political equilibrium, where investors want
more protection, while workers want less. Both papers have the built-in feature that
support for investor protection is an increasing function of  the ratio of  financial
wealth to human wealth (see also, in the growth literature, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).
Because they derive (relatively) more returns from capital than from labour, citizens
with such a high ratio are more likely to defend policies that guarantee returns to
capital.
Similarly, we expect a positive relationship, at the individual level, between the
amount of  financial wealth and support for profit maximizing firms. First as, obviously,
not maximizing profit makes firms’ investors – in particular equity holders – poorer.
Secondly, there is indirect evidence that non-profit maximizing firms tend to make
employees richer, which increases human wealth. A first very obvious testing ground
for such hypothesis is to look at privatizations. Investigating network industries,
Azmat 
 
et al.
 
 (2007) find that labour’s share decreases with privatization, which
indicates that state ownership biased hiring decisions towards more employment.
But such effects also show in private firms. For instance, there is a large literature in
finance exploring the ‘empire building’ hypothesis, that is, the fact that firms with
weak investors (dispersed shareholders, poor corporate governance) tend to over-invest
and over-hire to satisfy the hubris of  their CEOs. There is evidence of  such behaviour
in studies of  the hostile takeovers and LBOs of  the 1980s US (Kaplan, 1989), but the
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effect on employment is apparently small, if  not negligible. Another possibility is that
firms under pressure from their owners tend to behave in a more volatile way, which
transfers risk to employees (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).
Unfortunately, the WVS does not have data on financial wealth, so that it is not
possible to test this prediction directly. Instead, we will claim that the difference in
financial wealth between younger and older individuals is stronger in countries where
citizens have to save more for retirement. In countries with a full Pay-As-You-Go
system, individuals have to save very little over their life cycle to complement their
retirement income. As a result, in such countries, there is little difference in financial
wealth between younger and older workers, other things equal. In countries where
pensions are fully funded, older workers nearing the retirement age tend to own,
either directly or indirectly, more financial assets, than younger generations. We will
thus focus on the interaction between age and retirement systems, and ask the data
if  the sensitivity of  pro-capitalism attitude to age is increasing in the funding of  the
pension system. As discussed previously this approach where we focus on an interaction
term is analogous to the difference-in-difference methodology used in experimental settings.
As a robustness check we also look at
 
 de facto 
 
financial development as a measure
of  availability – affordability – of  financial assets for saving; in that case we are interested
in the interaction term between age and country-level degree of  financial development.
The intuition of  these specifications is that
 
 de facto 
 
financial development is an indirect
measure of  the costs to save (transaction costs, liquidity, competitiveness of  the money
management and the banking industry). Thus, given the higher propensity to save of
higher income individuals, the differential wealth across income categories should be
higher when the financial industry is more developed. The young–old differential
should also be larger, given that economic agents save more when costs are lower.
The self-interest view also makes predictions about attitudes toward competition,
albeit less sharp ones. In their study of  network industries, Azmat 
 
et al.
 
 (2007) find
that the share of  output that is appropriated by suppliers of  capital – one minus
labour’s share – tends to decline when measures competition increases. This fact is
perfectly consistent with standard economic intuition. An increase in competition
tends to wipe out profits margins: as a result, support for competition is lower for
agents with more financial wealth (this is, for instance, the assumption behind Rajan
and Zingales’ (2003b) analysis of  the political economy of  competition). Yet, within a
more elaborate model, it could be argued that forces of  competition also amplify firm
level uncertainty: this particular effect is harmless for shareholders, who can diversify,
but it may hurt workers who can only hold one job at once (Thesmar and Thoenig,
2006).
 
3
 
 Unless this second effect dominates the first one, however, we expect support for
competition to be a decreasing function of  the financial wealth to human wealth ratio.
 
3
 
One alternative could be that competition is interpreted in the survey as ‘international competition’ or ‘globalization’ (as in
O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). In this case, it should come as no surprise that owners of  capital, in capital rich countries,
favour ‘competition’, as it allows them to rent their capital in the world. In our dataset, however, there are 
 
a priori
 
 as many
capital rich, as capital poor countries. As a result, this mechanism should not generate any systematic bias in our methodology.
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2.3. The ‘slow learning hypothesis’
 
For all its intuitive appeal, the ‘self-interest view’ cannot fully explain the dispersion
in pro-capitalism tendencies across countries. Indeed, in all countries the representative
household has too little financial wealth. A recent study of  the US wealth distribution
(Kennickel, 2006) shows that the net worth of  the median US household is around
$93 000 in 2004. This figure is an overestimate of  net financial wealth as it also
includes real estate. Moreover, the representative household is unlikely to own stocks.
Guiso 
 
et al.
 
 (2003a) estimate that only 48% of  US households own stocks directly or
indirectly. This figure drops to 34% for the United Kingdom, 23% for France and
15% for Italy. This makes it unlikely that the median voter will just support profit
maximization by firms because it boosts the return of  its portfolio, given that his
human wealth (as well as his real estate wealth) is well above his financial wealth. Yet,
in the WVS, 57% of  the US respondents agree with the statement that the ‘owners
should appoint the management’. According to the General Social Survey (again
conducted in the United States, where equity ownership is the most diffused), more
than 70% of  the respondents who declare working for someone else agree with the
fact that ‘management should only care about profits’. Thus, the diffusion of  equity
ownership cannot explain 
 
alone
 
 why the citizens of  this country lend their support to
free markets more than in other countries.
Beyond self-serving rent-maximization, opinions also reflect beliefs that are only
imperfectly updated in the face of  new evidence. Thus, individuals and public opinion
are ‘slow learners’. One first line of  explanation is that individuals do not optimally
use the information that is available to them (i.e. they do not update their beliefs
using Bayes’ rule), and lean too much on their 
 
a-priori
 
. For instance, the cognitive
psychology literature has gathered ample experimental evidence that agents over-
weight new information congruent with their priors. This is the so-called ‘confirmatory
bias’ (for an economic model, see Rabin and Shrag, 1999). An important conse-
quence of  the confirmatory bias is that, even when faced with a large flow of  similar
information, the beliefs of  agents might not converge. At the cross-country level, the
difference in public attitudes toward capitalism can thus persist for a very long time.
But learning does not have to be irrational to be slow. It can follow from bounded
rationality constraints such as costly information acquisition. Even if  agents were to
use information optimally, learning about the actual impact of  economic reforms is
difficult, because such events are rare, and the link between reforms and performance
very noisy. This is especially true when most agents only have access to national
history to forge their beliefs. Given the paucity of  information, and the complexity of
the economic model to be estimated, even if  agents were to use information optimally
(were Bayesian), national opinions may 
 
never
 
 converge. This point is modelled theo-
retically by Piketty (1995) in the context of  beliefs about redistribution. Piketty argues
that, while the standard ‘political economy view’ of  redistributive politics would
suggest that low income people should vote in favour of  redistribution, it appears that
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voting patterns are only weakly explained by income differentials. Many working-class
persons support right-wing, anti-redistributive policies on the ground that they induce
too many distortions, in spite of  the fact that it would be in their interest to do so. As
it turns out, parental income explains voting decisions as much as one’s personal
income, which suggests that people start with the beliefs of  their parents and update
them using their own experience. As Piketty points out, it is difficult to learn much
about the costs and benefits of  redistribution purely based on one’s family experience,
so that, even if  agents are Bayesian they may never converge to the right beliefs.
Moreover, as explained by Glaeser (2006), agents have ‘weak incentives to learn the
truth’ about the optimality of  various economic policies as their individual votes are
unlikely to be pivotal. In turn, this leaves room for influence groups such as political
lobbies to ‘scramble’ information at their own advantage.
Whether one favours the behavioural view or Piketty’s Bayesian model, the slow
learning hypothesis for cross-country dispersion in opinions rests on two important
assumptions. The first assumption is that initial priors matter a great deal in shaping
future opinions. The second assumption is that individuals overweight their own
experience; they do not exploit enough information about foreign experiences, and
rely too much on domestic, idiosyncratic, experiences to update their priors.
One consequence of  this is that young generations, when they experience a radi-
cally different economic context than older generations, should have different opin-
ions. Thus we will focus our analysis on the generational differences in former
socialist countries. We estimate whether the difference in pro-market attitudes
between individuals who were born before and after 1970 is 
 
larger
 
 in former socialist
countries than in other comparable countries. The econometric specification will be
the one of  Equation (1) and will allow controlling for country fixed effects.
Then we ask whether learning is home biased. If  it is the case, agents should update
their beliefs by overweighting their home country economic performance rather than by
comparing systematically the worldwide relative performance of  free markets versus
less free market economies. More specifically, we will estimate the correlation between
pro-capitalism attitudes and economic growth. First, as an indirect test of  the ‘con-
firmatory bias’ hypothesis, we expect that pro-capitalism attitudes overreact to positive
growth shocks in countries that have the most market friendly institutions. Secondly, as
a test of  the domestic bias in learning, we will compare the relative force of  domestic and
foreign experiences in the formation of  opinions by estimating the reaction of  domestic
attitudes when other market friendly economies in the world experience a higher growth.
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
3.1. Datasets
 
We use two types of  datasets: Household-level survey for opinions and attitudes;
Country-level surveys for economic and institutional data.
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On the opinion side, our main source is the ‘integrated’ dataset of  the WVS, which
has collected answers about various attitudes across countries for the past 25 years.
This ‘integrated’ dataset is a repeated cross-section that comes in four waves (1981–1984,
1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 2000–2004). For each wave, representative samples of
households from different countries were surveyed, using a harmonized questionnaire.
Country coverage increases from one wave to the next. In the first wave, 21 countries
were surveyed. The second, third and fourth waves have 82 countries. Sample size
varies across countries. For instance, in the first wave, the US had 2325 data points,
while Malta only 467. These outliers aside, sample size is between 1000 and 1400 for
the remaining countries. In the fourth wave, there is a little more dispersion: most
countries have between 1000 and 2000 data points, the Ukraine has 2811.
In addition to attitudes (on economics, but also on marriage, religion etc.), the
WVS also provides us with basic socio demographics: age, gender, education, income
(three categories), job held, and employment status. These variables will be used both
as controls and variable of  interest.
We also use economic data, available at the country level. National accounts are
retrieved from the Penn World Table which covers the period from 1950 to 2004. We
also use two measures of  financial development. The first one is the standard 
 
de facto
 
measure constructed as the sum of  stock market capitalization to GDP and private
credit to GDP (from Beck and Levine, 2004). The second measure is a 
 
de jure
 
 measure
of  financial development ranking from 0 to 3 (from Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008).
We also use the extent of  pension funding measured as the ratio of  pension funds +
life insurance liabilities to GDP in 2003 (source: OECD). Finally we use an index of
product market deregulation (defined as the opposite of  the index of  regulatory bar-
riers to entry taken from Djankov 
 
et al.
 
, 2002).
 
3.2. Three measures of pro-capitalism beliefs
 
This paper investigates the determinants of  pro capitalism attitudes. To do so, we
base our analysis on three variables constructed from the WVS, which we will use as
our left-hand side variables:
 
•
 
Private ownership:
 
 Respondents were asked to grade the merits of  private
ownership of  business and industry on a scale from 1 to 10, from ‘Private own-
ership of  business and industry should be increased’ (1) to ‘Government owner-
ship of  business and industry should be increased’ (10). We construct a dummy
variable equal to 1 if  the respondent selects a grade below 5.
 
•
 
Owner control:
 
 This question is about which stakeholder should have effective
control of  firms. The exact phrasing of  the question is ‘There is a lot of  discussion
about how business and industry should be managed. Which of  these four state-
ments comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business
or appoint the managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate
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in the selection of  managers, (3) The government should be the owner and
appoint the managers or (4) The employees should own the business and should
elect the managers.’ We construct a dummy equal to 1 when the respondent
selects the first statement.
 
•
 
Competition is good:
 
 We use the following question from the WVS: ‘How
would you place your views on this scale: Competition is good, it stimulates
people to work hard and develop new ideas (1) or competition is harmful. It
brings the worst out of  people (10)’. We construct a dummy equal to 1 when
answers are less than or equal to 7.
The reason we use these three different proxies is twofold: First, we want to docu-
ment the robustness of  our results to the choice of  different questions from the WVS.
Second, because individuals benefiting from free financial markets are not necessarily
those benefiting from competition, using these different proxies enables us to distin-
guish between the two theories we test.
The data show a large variation in cross country attitudes toward free markets.
Table 1 displays mean variables for all three attitudes within the 18 richest countries
in our sample – in terms of  PPP GDP per capita.
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the sample statistics for these attitudes, as well
as for various socio-demographic characteristics that will serve both as controls and
variables of  interest. Approximately 40% of  the respondents have average income
and average education. Their average age is 41 years old. Women account for 52%
Table 1. Attitudes towards corporate profits for various countries
Owner should 
control the firm
Competition 
is good
Private 
ownership
New Zealand 64.1 56.5 73.8
United States 57.7 62.8 86.3
Canada 53.8 59.5 81.2
Australia 50.3 63.9 81.8
Austria 49.8 62.5 87.2
Switzerland 46.9 64.8 84.9
United Kingdom 46.0 47.3 67.2
Iceland 45.2 72.5 83.3
Denmark 44.3 47.8 83.6
Belgium 44.0 41.8 78.9
Singapore 42.9 57.6 56.8
Japan 40.4 34.2 70.3
Finland 37.8 48.6 81.9
Germany 36.5 58.1 77.8
Norway 34.8 58.4 77.3
Netherlands 33.6 33.1 78.5
Sweden 32.5 60.1 76.5
France 22.0 40.5 80.8
Note: Figures represent country averages for each of  the three attitudes (in %).
Source: World Value Survey.
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of  the sample; 63% of  the respondents think that private ownership of  business should
be increased, 37% of  them prefer to leave firm control to owners, rather than to the
state, the employees, or joint representatives of  employees and owners.
Beyond sample means, it is interesting to see how the three measures of  pro-
capitalism attitudes correlate with each other. The propensity to support private
ownership is well correlated with the ‘owner control’ (0.14) and ‘competition’ (0.14).
These correlation coefficients are surprisingly large, given the large number of  obser-
vations. More surprisingly perhaps, ‘owner control’ and ‘competition’ are also posi-
tively correlated (0.08), albeit to a lesser extent.
 
4. TESTING THE ‘SELF-INTEREST HYPOTHESIS’
 
In this section, we test the ‘self-interest hypothesis’, whereby attitudes toward private
profit reflect respondents’ own economic interests. As discussed in Section 1, testing
the ‘self-interest hypothesis’ suggests running a logistic regression as described in
Equation (1) where the variable of  interest 
 
C
 
it × Z c corresponds to the interaction
between individual age and the extent of  pension funding at the country level. We
expect the coefficient of  this variable to be positive, as the difference in financial
wealth between old and young people is likely to be larger in countries where pen-
sions are funded. The first advantage of  this identification strategy is that it uses inter
individual variability to test the ‘self  interest hypothesis’. It does not rely on cross-
country correlations between, say, pension and average pro-capitalism attitudes, that
would be difficult to interpret causally. The second advantage of  this approach is that
it allows controlling for individual characteristics, such as income, education or age,
which may be argued to affect support for private profits.
As it turns out, we estimate 12 different versions of  Equation (1), whose results are
reported in Table 2. All specifications include country fixed effects, year dummies and
the socio-demographic characteristics provided by the WVS: age, gender, income and
education.
In Table 2, columns 1–4 take ‘private ownership’ as a dependent variable, columns
5–8 take ‘owner control’; columns 9–12 take ‘competition is good’. In columns 1, 5 and 9,
our main variable of  interest is the interaction between age and the extent of  pension
funds while in columns 3, 7 and 11, it is the interaction between income and the extent
of  pension funds. Specifications 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 replicate columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
11 with a measure of  financial development instead of  pension funding. As discussed
in Section 1, the ‘self-interest’ theory predicts all those interaction terms to be positive.
In 9 cases out of  12 specifications, results are statistically significant. In countries
where pensions are funded, in financially developed countries, the old are much more
likely to be supporters of  free markets than the young. Higher income individuals are
more likely to support profit-making behaviour in financially developed countries,
comparatively to poorer agents. On the contrary, the high income–low income gap
is lower when agents have to save for retirement. Results relating to attitudes toward
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Table 2. Pro-capitalism and financial wealth
Dependent variable Opinion on ‘private ownership’ Opinion on ‘owner control’ Opinion on ‘competition is good’
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(Pensions Fund) × (age)  0.018**  0.036***  0.018***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
(Financial Dev.) × (age)  0.005***  0.008***  0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
(Pensions Fund) × (income) −0.077 −0.224  0.650***
 [0.256]  [0.214] [0.205]
(Financ. Dev.) × (income)  0.056***  0.090***  0.028
[0.020] [0.022] [0.019]
Observations 37 810 10 060 37 810 100 600 25 204 82 946 25 204 82 946 42 954 95 765 42 954 95 765
Notes: Logit estimates. All specifications include year fixed effects, country fixed effects and socio-demographic controls (age, income, education and gender – unreported
coefficients). Income is a dummy equal to 1 if  individual income is reported as high (as opposed to medium or low). Columns 1–4 use ‘private ownership’ as the dependent
variable. Columns 5–8 use ‘Owner control’ as the dependent variable. Columns 9–12 use ‘Competition is good’ as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Sources: WVS for attitudes and socio-demographics (see text), OECD (2003) for pension funds (2003 ratio of  life insurance and pension funds liabilities to GDP), Beck and
Levine (2004) for financial development (current year ratio of  private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP).
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competition (columns 9–12) show that higher net wealth individuals are more, not less,
likely to support competition. This empirical finding goes against the simple economic
intuition that competition tends to increase labour’s share in total GDP, and therefore,
improves the welfare of  workers more than the welfare of  capitalists. As suggested in
our theoretical discussion above, one possibility is that competition is associated with
more turbulence on the labour market that capitalists are protected from.
Quantitatively, the effects are small. Let us consider the difference in probability to
support private profits of  agents aged 30 and agents aged 50 (this corresponds to
approximately one standard deviation of  age). Taking estimates of  column 1, this
implies that, when the ratio of  contractual savings (pension funds plus life insurance)
increases by 10% of  GDP (again, one sample standard deviation), differential support
for private ownership increases by 0.6 percentage points (compared to a sample mean
for the dependent variable of  63%). The old–young gap widens significantly, but to
a small extent, when pensions become more likely to be funded. Quantitatively, the
effect is twice as large for the question on owner control. Thus, the ‘self-interest view’
holds, but it has a small predictive power over the dispersion of  pro-capitalism attitudes.
5. TESTING THE ‘SLOW LEARNING HYPOTHESIS’
To explain the persistence in cross-country differences in pro-capitalism attitudes, the
‘slow learning’ hypothesis rests on two assumptions: first, agents learn slowly, and
second, they overweight the economic history of  their country. We will test these
assumptions in turn. Put together, these two assumptions explain why (sincere) differ-
ences opinions may survive in the long run; but they do not explain the cross-section
variation in country level opinions. This is why we will then investigate the explanatory
power of  long-run historical determinants of  these opinions in Section 6.
5.1. Slow learning: evidence from former socialist countries
To look at learning, it is natural to ask if  the young believe differently from the old.
A reason for this is that, at birth and throughout their education, both generations
have lived through different experiences. One example of  very radical change in expo-
sition of  the young to capitalist institutions is the transition away from communism
of  eastern European countries. In these countries, we thus compare pro-capitalism
attitudes held by younger generations to attitudes of  generations that were already
adults when the Berlin Wall fell. This can be done by running the following logistic
regressions on WVS data, for individual i, living in country c, in wave t:
attict = αc + δt + β ·POSTi × SOCc + γ ·POSTi + controlsict + εict (2)
where αc is a country fixed effect, δt a temporal effect. SOC is a dummy equal to 1
when country c was a communist country. POST is equal to 1 when individual i is
born after 1970, and zero else.
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The ‘slow learning’ theory predicts β to be positive. This methodology generalizes
a recent paper by Alesina and Fuchs (2007), whose focus, unlike ours, is on attitudes
toward redistribution. They find that, in East Germany, older generations are much
more likely to support income equality than newer ones, when compared to West
Germany. They interpret this as evidence that people’s preferences are shaped in
their early adulthood by the economic system they live in. Like Alesina and Fuchs,
our methodology is akin to a difference (across countries) in difference (across gener-
ations) approach. It has the advantage to control for possible differences in attitude
across generations that would be the same across countries (the γ coefficients), as well
as country fixed effects.
Estimates of  (2) are reported in Table 3, with different dependent variables.
Column 1 uses attitudes toward ‘private ownership’ (as opposed to public ownership).
Column 2 uses the ‘owner control’ variable (as opposed to firm control, by employees
or the state). And column 3 uses attitudes toward ‘competition’.
From Table 3 we get that the coefficient of  POST is negative: younger generations
are less pro-capitalism than older ones in countries that have not experienced a
socialist regime. The difference is statistically significant at 1%, but not large quanti-
tatively. Using marginal estimates, we find that the probability that a young person
supports private property over state ownership of  firms is lower by 3 percentage
points (compared to a sample mean of  63%, and a mean of  about 64% for non-former
socialist economies). The probability of  supporting control by owners only is lower
by a tiny 1 percentage point (with a sample mean of  37%). Opinions are less likely to
be pro-competition by some 2 percentage points (sample mean: 75%). Such differences
between the young and the old are difficult to interpret economically. We paid
attention to control for linear age effects in the regressions, but the POST dummy
may still capture straight age effect, instead of  a pure cohort effect. Thus, this difference
in opinions may simply mean that younger people are inherently less confident in mar-
kets (out of, say, ideological reasons). Alternatively, it could be a generational effect.
Table 3. The generational divide in post-communist countries
Dependent variable Opinion on ‘private 
ownership’
Opinion on 
‘owner control’
Opinion on 
‘competition is good’
post-1990 −0.157*** −0.053** −0.092***
 [0.020]  [0.022]  [0.021]
(Former Socialist country) 
× (post-1990)
0.435*** 0.428*** 0.236***
 [0.032]  [0.038]  [0.031]
Observations 131 825 105 922 126 116
Notes: Logit estimates. All specifications include year fixed effects, country fixed effects and socio-demographic
controls (age, income, education and gender – unreported coefficients). Column 1 uses ‘private ownership’ as the
dependent variable; column 2 uses ‘Owner control’; column 3 uses ‘Competition is good’. ‘Post-1990’ is a dummy
equal to 1 if  the individual is 20 years old after 1990 (hence born after 1970). Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Sources: WVS for attitudes and socio-demographics (see text).
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The more interesting fact from Table 3 is that the coefficient β of  the interaction
term has the expected sign and is statistically significant in the three specifications:
the generational divide is reversed in former socialist countries, where younger citi-
zens are much more pro-capitalism than older ones. The difference is quantitatively
sizeable. For a young person, the probability of  supporting more private property is
larger by 6 percentage points. For the second variable, the probability is larger by 8
percentage points. These two effects are much larger than what was found when we
tested the ‘self-interest hypothesis’, which suggests that the ‘slow learning hypotheses’
can have, under such radical circumstances, a large explanatory power. Interestingly,
we find that attitudes toward competition display the same type of  feature, but that
the difference across generations is smaller: some 3 percentage points. This gives us
further confidence that individual beliefs in market forces are more coherent than
what the ‘pure self-interest hypothesis’ would suggest.
The effects that we find are smaller than what Alesina and Fuchs (2007) have in
their study of  attitudes towards redistribution. In their paper, compared to people
born after 1975, people from former East Germany born before 1960 are between
10 to 40 percentage points more likely to support a high level of  redistribution
(comparing to West Germans). This suggests that the forces that shape the preference
for redistribution are not necessarily the same as those which shape attitudes toward
market forces. Since the Berlin Wall fell, most former (i.e. old) residents of  post-
communist countries may agree that private property and competition are better at
getting things done than central planning but may still display strong preferences for
redistribution (in particular since East Germany has received more than one trillion
euros in transfers from West Germany since reunification).
5.2. Domestic information bias
We have shown the importance of  path dependence in the formation of  beliefs on
economic systems. We now want to highlight a complementary mechanism of  belief
stickiness: when updating their beliefs about the efficiency of  various economic sys-
tems, we ask if  individuals overweight their own country’s history, and underweight
other countries’ experiences. This, along with the persistence documented in Section
5.1, would explain why cross-country differences in public opinion could persist.
For that purpose, we go back to our panel data and categorize countries as ‘LDF’
(less developed financially) if  their level of  financial development (the sum of  stock
market capitalization to GDP and private credit to GDP) is below median. This is
the dimension of  ‘Economic systems’ that we explore. We exploit our panel structure
to look at whether good domestic economic performance leads to stronger beliefs
about the local economic system. For individual i, in country c, in year t, our econo-
metric specification is the following:
attict = αc + δt + γ ·Growthct + β·LDFct × Growthct + controlsict + εict (3)
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which is estimated using a logistic regression. αc is a country fixed effect, δt a temporal
effect and Growth is the growth rate of  GDP. To test how other countries’ information
enters the updating process, for each country-year (c,t), we also construct
‘Other_System_Growth’, the mean growth in countries ruled by the other economic
system than c at year t and perform the following regression:
attict = αc + δt + γ ·Growthct + β·LDFct × Growthict + γ ′·Other_System_Growthct + β·LDFct 
× Other_System_Growthct + controlsict + εict (4)
We include country and time fixed effects and our individual controls are age, sex,
education, income, and report the results in Table 4. In columns 1, 3 and 5, we
report the estimates of  Equation (3) for the two attitudes toward private profits, and
for the belief  in the virtue of  competition. Columns 2, 4 and 6 contain the three
estimates of  Equation (4).
In four out of  six specifications, the results are directionally coherent with Bayesian
updating: in ‘less financially developed’ countries that perform well, individuals tend
to become even more averse to surrendering the full control of  firms to their owners,
and doubt more often the virtues of  competition. Yet, they seem, on average, to
welcome more private ownership of  firms. The effects are less large than in the
section above. For instance, let us compare two countries whose growth rates are 2
percentage points apart (approximately one standard deviation). The differential support
for owner control in market economies (compared to non-market economies) will be
larger by some 2 percentage points. This is small compared to a sample mean of  37%.
Table 4. When growth fails: attribution bias in pro-capitalism attitudes
Firm private Owner should control Competition is good
GDP Growth −0.039*** −0.042*** 0.052*** 0.053**** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP Growth*LDF 0.028*** 0.037*** −0.062*** −0.064*** −0.046*** −0.032***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Other_System_Growth 0.056*** 0.038** 0.143***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013)
Other_System_Growth*LDF 0.030 0.104*** 0.072***
(0.022) (0.040) (0.021)
Number of  countries 54 54 44 44 54 54
Observations 100 600 99 292 82 946 80 617 95 765 95 765
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Notes: Logit estimates. Attitude toward ‘private firms’ is the dependent variable in columns 1–2, ‘owner control’
in columns 3–4 and ‘competition’ in column 5–6. Socio-demographic controls include age, income, education
and gender. LDF is a dummy equal to 1 if  the country has above median financial development. GDP growth
is current year own country GDP growth. ‘Other system growth’ is the average growth rate of  countries that
have LDF = 1 if  the home country has LDF = 0, and conversely. All regressions include individual
characteristics (gender, age, education), as well as country and year dummies. Error terms are clustered at the
(country, year) level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Sources: WVS for attitudes and socio-demographics (see text), Penn World Tables for GDP growth, Beck and
Levine (2004) for financial development (current year ratio of  private credit and stock market capitalization to
GDP).
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Looking at columns 4 and 6, we see that while not totally neglecting information
from other countries, individuals seem to rely more heavily on their own country’s
history to update their beliefs about the virtues of  markets, even though, from the
perspective of  an econometrician, a single (growth, country, year) observation is
unlikely to have a significant impact on the beliefs one should hold about the efficiency
of  markets.
Thus, the evidence of  Table 4 is consistent with the fact that growth is attributed
to the merits of  the system in place, so that the beliefs in the current system become
stronger in high growth times. We do not find direct evidence for confirmatory bias
as negative information coming from the good performance of  opposite economic
systems seems to be taken into account by individuals in their revisions. All in all,
these results are consistent with Piketty (1995)’s intuition: the beliefs of  a country’s
population might not converge due to the over-sampling of  information coming from
one’s own country.
6. CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE: CULTURE AND ECONOMIC ATTITUDES
Using individual data, our study of  the determinants of  economic attitudes concludes
to the importance of  sticky beliefs. In this context, the country fixed effects in our
individual regressions can tentatively be interpreted as capturing country-specific
cultural traits. A theory of  the origin of  culture is of  course largely beyond the scope
of  this paper, but, while remaining cautious on the interpretation, we ask here how
economic attitudes across countries relate to other cultural variables. The variables
we look at are the following:
• Religion: In his famous essay, ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capitalism’,
Max Weber developed the thesis that Calvinism had a major facilitation role on
the development of  capitalism in Europe and the United States. Guiso et al. (2003b)
have shown that religion is correlated with a wide range of  economic attitudes.
They find the Jewish and Protestant religions to be more correlated with the
presence of  pro-capitalism preferences, and that in general being religious is
positively correlated with a positive perception of  work and thrift. To explore the
impact of  religion on cross-country economic attitudes, we use the data from
Botero et al. (2004) which give the percentage of  different religions (Protestant,
Muslim and Catholic) in the population of  countries in 1980.
• Trust: Many existing studies have shown that trust explains well the cross section
of  various economic outcomes, such as GDP growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997),
the existence of  large firms (La Porta et al., 1999), or the quality of  labour rela-
tions (Algan and Cahuc, 2007). More related to our work, Guiso et al. (2005) have
shown that trust is positively correlated with stock-market participation, both at
the country and at the individual level. The level of  trust is therefore a natural
candidate when it comes to explain differences in attitudes toward markets. The
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related question in the WVS is ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’
We construct a variable equal to 1 when the respondent answers that ‘most
people can be trusted’, and take the mean of  this variable at the country level.
• Legal Origin: In a series of  influential papers, Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer
and Vishny find that, in the cross-section of  countries, legal origins (UK common
law versus French civil law) are strong predictors of  economic institutions. The
interpretation of  this correlation remains open to debate, some authors arguing
that it may be driven by the political equilibrium, much more than legal institu-
tions themselves (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003a; Perrotti and Von Thadden,
2006, among others). For our purpose, including legal origin is a natural way to
get a first shot at isolating the long-run historical and institutional determinants
of  economic sentiment.
We collapse our individual data at the country level variable by taking the mean of
each variable and then we regress our measures of  economic attitudes on the above
country-level cultural variables:
attc = α + β ·‘cultural variable’c + controlsc + εc (5)
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results. For each attitude, in one out of  four
specifications, we include population size (resp. GDP per capita) as controls to make
sure that our cultural variables are not simply capturing the opposition of  large versus
small (resp. rich versus poor) countries.
A bit less than half  of  the cross-country variation in economic attitudes is explained
by the variables we have chosen. Trust appears positively related to attitudes toward
‘private firm’ but not toward the other two pro-capitalism attitudes. Confirming Max
Weber’s theory, the fraction of  Protestants is positively related to the pro-capitalism
attitudes in a country, significantly so for ‘Firm Private’ and ‘Owner Control’. The
most surprising result is perhaps the strong explanatory power of  Legal Origin. Note
that in these regressions British legal origin is the default. Legal origin has a signifi-
cant impact and substantially increases all the regressions R-squared. Notably, French
legal origin is strongly related to competition aversion and British common law to a
strong preference for owner control. Interestingly, in non-reported regressions, we
found that countries with Scandinavian and German legal origins tend to be the ones
that support ‘joint management by owners and workers’ the most. These countries
actually tend to be ones where this joint management is actually favoured by law and
the structure of  collective bargaining (Algan and Cahuc, 2007). While it convincingly
shows the link between long-run history and current beliefs, the interpretation of  the
role of  legal origin is somewhat ambiguous. In the context of  the ‘slow learning
hypothesis’, one can interpret legal origin as a proxy for some cultural traits that have
subsisted and still determine pro-market attitudes. But one could also favour an
interpretation more aligned with the ‘self-interest’ view: Legal origin might determine
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Table 5. Cultural variables and cultural attitudes across countries
Dependent variable Firm private Owner should control Competition is good
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Trust 0.234* −0.086 −0.035 −0.045 −0.038 −0.120*
(−0.119) (−0.125) (−0.106) (−0.104) (−0.061) (−0.064)
Catholic 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0 −0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (−0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Muslim −0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.000 0.000
(−0.001) (−0.001) (−0.001) (−0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Protestant 0.003*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.002* 0.000 0.001
(−0.001) (−0.001) (−0.001) (−0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Leg. Orig. French −0.089* −0.135*** −0.077** −0.089** −0.052** −0.066***
(−0.045) (−0.041) (−0.035) (−0.035) (−0.021) (−0.019)
Leg. Orig. German 0.094 0.011 −0.074 −0.100** −0.026 −0.012
(−0.069) (−0.056) (−0.05) (−0.044) (−0.031) (−0.023)
Leg. Orig. Scandinav. 0.157** −0.034 −0.067 −0.240*** −0.005 −0.011
(−0.074) (−0.098) (−0.056) −0.08 (−0.033) (−0.041)
Leg. Orig. Socialist −0.046 −0.048 −0.167*** −0.201*** 0.006 −0.008
(−0.046) (−0.041) (−0.035) (−0.034) (−0.021) (−0.017)
GDP per capita (log) 0.061** −0.008 −0.019*
(−0.024) (−0.02) (−0.01)
Population (log) −0.008 −0.020** −0.001
(−0.01) (−0.009) (−0.004)
Observations 82 77 79 75 80 75 77 74 76 71 73 70
R2 0.05 0.26 0.19 0.46 0.00 0.12 0.24 0.47 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.44
Notes: Attitudes are computed as averages over individuals and survey waves, such that there is only one observation per country. This table presents plain OLS estimates. The
fraction of  individuals in different religions comes from Botero et al. (2004) and is measured in 1980. Attitude toward ‘Private Firm’ is the dependent variable in columns 1–4,
‘Owner control’ is the dependent variable in columns 5–8 and ‘Competition is good’ in columns 9–12.
***, **, * stand for significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Sources: WVS for attitude variables (see text), Penn World Tables for Population and GDP.
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persistent differences in the distribution of  rents which explain its explanatory power
on today’s attitudes. We remain agnostic between these two interpretations.
Legal origin and, to a large extent, religion are variables determined by a country’s
pre-20th century history. These last results suggest that country level attitudes are
basically shaped by long-run institutional forces rooted in the history and culture of
a country rather than by recent trends and transformations.
7. DO BELIEFS AFFECT THE ADOPTION OF ECONOMIC REFORMS?
From a policy point of  view, understanding the determinants of  pro capitalism
attitudes is important because attitudes are likely to affect the feasibility of  economic
reforms. Is there evidence of  such causality from aggregate beliefs to country’s
institutions?
A recent economic literature attempts to show that national opinions do shape
economic institutions and performance. For example, Algan and Cahuc (2005) argue
that civic attitudes affect the performance of  labour market institutions. They use as
instrumental variables for today’s opinion the civic attitudes of  descendants of  emi-
grants to the US. Tabellini (2007) complements Knack and Keefer’s (1997) findings
by showing that social capital, measured as trusting attitudes, predicts economic
development in regions of  Europe.
Before investigating causality, we can see from Figure 1 that attitudes toward pri-
vate ownership are strongly correlated with the market friendliness of  economic insti-
tutions. Each panel explores the cross-country correlation between the average
support for private business (defined as the share of  citizens who think that private
ownership of  firms is more desirable than government ownership) and the extent of
various pro-market institutions: a de jure index of  product market deregulation
(defined as the opposite of  the index of  regulatory barriers to entry taken from
Djankov et al., 2002); a de facto measure of  financial development (see Section 3); a
de jure measure of  financial development (from Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008); and
a de facto measure of  pension funding (see Section 3). It clearly appears that in countries
where private ownership receives strong support in public opinion, product market
entry is less difficult, financial development is high and pensions tend to be more
funded.
In Table 6 we provide some suggestive evidence that these correlations may be
interpreted causally.4 Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 report the results of  OLS estimates
corresponding to the scatter plots in Figure 1. Obviously, those correlations between
attitudes and institutions could reflect a two-way causation or could be driven by
4 Table 6 reports only the specifications where our variable of  interest is attitude toward ‘private ownership’. Results for attitudes
toward ‘owner control’ and ‘competition is good’ are not reported and are available upon request from the authors. For ‘owner
control’ the estimates on the coefficient of  interests are similar for the signs and the statistical significance in simple regressions
(i.e. columns 1, 3, 5, 7) and similar for the signs only, in the interacted regressions (columns 2, 4, 6, 8). For ‘Competition is good’
the coefficients are never significant.
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Figure 1. Pro-capitalism and market friendly institutions
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Table 6. Institutions and pro-capitalism
Dependent variable Product market 
deregulation (de jure)
Financial development 
(de facto)
Financial development 
(de jure)
Extent of  pension 
funds (de facto)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
‘Private Ownership’ 15.6*** −1.5 1.9*** −0.8 9.4 −47.9* 0.4** −0.9*
[3.3] [6.6] [0.5] [1.0] [7.2] [24.2] [0.2] [0.5]
‘Priv.Owner.’ × democracy 2.4*** 0.2 5.7* 0.1*
[0.8] [0.1] [2.9] [0.1]
log(GDP per cap) 0.1 0.4*** 2.3  −0.0
[0.7] [0.1] [1.8]  [0.1]
Democracy −1.4*** −0.1 −3.5**  −0.1
[0.4] [0.1] [1.6]  [0.0]
Observations 
(No of  countries)
63 59 63 58 21 21 30 28
R2 0.30 0.40 0.17 0.41 0.08 0.36 0.18 0.26
Note: The measure of  Product Market Deregulation is minus the number of  steps needed to start a business (Djankov et al., 2002). It is larger (closer to zero) when entry is less
regulated. The de facto measure of  financial development is taken from Beck and Levine’s (2004) most recent database, and is computed as the ratio of  private credit and stock
market capitalization to GDP. The measure of  De Jure Financial Development is taken from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) composite index ranking between 0 and 3. Both
measures are larger when the financial industry is more developed. Extent of  Pension Funds is measured as the 2003 ratio of  life insurance and pension funds liabilities to GDP.
‘Private ownership’ is a country level average measures of  attitudes toward private firms (as opposed to state ownership). It is larger when the country is more ‘pro market’.
Democracy is an index from Polity IV dataset: it is higher, the more democratic the institutions. Standard errors are in brackets.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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omitted variables. We have no instrumental variable, but we take a first step in this
direction by asking whether these correlations are higher in countries where the
median voter is more influential, i.e. democracies. Thus, we regress our various
institution variables on attitudes toward private ownership interacted with the extent of
democracy (from the Polity IV Dataset). This interaction term is intended to capture
the causal effect of  attitudes toward institutions. We also control for obvious correlates
of  institutions and attitudes such as GDP per capita and democracy. As it appears
from column 2, 4, 6 and 8, in three out of  four specifications, the market friendliness
of  institutions is significantly more impacted by average opinion in democracies than
in more autocratic regimes. This is consistent with public opinions having an impact
on economic institutions.
8. CONCLUSION
According to neo-classical economists, Pareto-improvements can be reached if
market-friendly reforms are taking place simultaneously with the compensation of
individuals losing rents in those reforms. However, pro-market politicians often fail to
convince a majority of  individuals that such economic reforms can ultimately benefit
them. The goal of  this paper was to investigate the origins of  anti-market sentiment
and to understand better its variations across populations, countries and time.
Our results are twofold: First, we find that the traditional ‘self-interest hypothesis’
according to which individuals hold political opinions that are self-serving indeed receives
some support from the data. Yet, their explanatory power is small. Second, we find that
learning about the merits of  economic systems has some degree of  sub-optimality.
Economic experiences in early adulthood, idiosyncratic performances of  the domestic
economy, rather than foreign countries’ experiences, matter a lot in shaping beliefs
about economic systems. We show that the explanatory power of  the ‘slow learning’
hypothesis is larger than the effects generated by the ‘self-interest hypothesis’.
Our results suggest that economic reform’s feasibility does not depend solely on its
impact on the distribution of  rents; ideological a-priori beliefs are likely to be important
determinants as well. Politicians are more likely to successfully pass pro-market
reforms in times where the economic performance of  the country is lower because
these are times where the aggregate efficiency of  the current system is put into doubt.
Discussion
Maristella Botticini
Università di Torino
This paper adds a novel contribution to the empirical literature that investigates the
interactions between cultural values and economic variables. The empirical analysis
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relies on the World Value Survey (supplemented with other datasets). The main findings
are threefold. First, at the individual level, there seems to be support for the theory that
individuals who have less to gain from pro-markets institutions, tend to disfavour them.
Second, at the country level, rent-seeking explanations of  economic beliefs explain little
of  the cross-country differences in anti-market sentiment. Third, cross-country differ-
ences in anti-market sentiment seem to depend on past cultural and historical factors.
I think this work asks a policy relevant question for policy makers who intend to
implement a policy change. However, I have to be critical for a variety of  reasons.
The paper refers to some papers and theories but it does not spell out clearly which
specific model is going to be estimated or tested. This is not the main goal of  this
work but the paper would gain in clarity if  a model is presented, spelled out clearly,
and then estimated or tested. The section on the two theories is important because
it should provide the theoretical background to the empirical exercise in the subsequent
sections. This section can be improved by clarifying what exactly is the theory or
theories that are going to be tested or the model that is going to be estimated.
With the caveat regarding the ‘theory’ mentioned above, the empirical exercise is
executed in a competent way. Most findings are convincing and seem reasonable.
Nevertheless, the criticisms and scepticism about using the World Value Survey (and
similar surveys) – e.g. what is the incentive for people to provide truthful information,
whether people understand correctly the questions, etc. – apply to this paper, as well
as to other works based on similar datasets.
The discussion of  the finding that people with higher incomes show strong support
for market forces and competition is not very clear. The same applies to the discussion
about why skilled workers may favour competition. This comment goes back to the
general point raised above: what model or what theory is going to be tested in this
paper? Finally, it would have been interesting to get an intuition about the interesting
(actually puzzling) finding that richer countries show less support for competition.
Kevin O’Rourke
Trinity College Dublin
Let me say at the outset that I found this paper to be clearly structured and interest-
ing, and that its consistent methodology made for a coherent and convincing piece
of  work. As to the main purpose of  the article, understanding what the authors call
‘capitalism aversion’ is to my mind, given my background and training, an essentially
historical task. At least, it would be historical, unless you accept that the pure rational
choice model focused on individual self-interest was the only force shaping individual
political preferences, a claim which presumably no-one takes particularly seriously,
and which in any event the authors of  this paper do a good job of  debunking.
The alternative to rational self-interest that the authors consider is labelled by
them ‘slow learning’, which as they note is consistent with rationality if  there are costs
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of  acquiring information. If  the costs of  acquiring information about other countries
were higher than the costs of  acquiring information about one’s own country, and
I suppose that they are, then it would also be rational to ‘overweight’ information
about one’s own country when updating one’s beliefs, which is something that the
authors say happens in practice, based on their results. Actually, I was not convinced
by this conclusion of  the paper, since Table 4 seemed to me to show that respondents
did take into account information from other countries when forming their beliefs,
and I had no way of  figuring out if  the sizes of  the coefficients involved implied ‘over-
sampling’ or ‘under-sampling’ of  particular types of  information.
A broader question that I have, however, and to my mind a more important one,
is the extent to which we should lock ourselves into the sort of  rational interpretation
of  beliefs and values that the ‘slow learning’ label implies. I thus found myself
wondering whether ‘interests versus slow learning’ is really the key distinction that
the authors should be focusing on, or at least whether these are the right labels. What
about the far more widespread distinction which political scientists make between
‘interests and ideology’, or, more neutrally, between ‘interests and ideas’? Anyone who
has read through British Parliamentary debates regarding trade policy during the late
19th century will have been struck by the hold which free trade ideology had on the
participants in those debates. Presumably if  former occupants of  the Communist bloc
are more anti-capitalist than others, this is at least in part because ideas – in this case
Marxist ones – have an independent life of  their own (and not just because these
people went through a different economic history, and learned accordingly). Schools,
families, religions and political parties all matter for beliefs. Geoff  Harcourt once told
me that if  you knew someone’s position on the Vietnam War, you could accurately
predict their position on the Cambridge Capital Controversy. That may be too glib
(and indeed the statement was made in a pub), but still, values and ideology do help
shape peoples’ attitudes, or at least there are an awful lot of  academics out there who
think they do.
In my own work with Richard Sinnott on attitudes towards trade and immigration
(O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001b, 2006) we found that the most important variables
explaining these attitudes were not economic, but rather non-economic factors such
as nationalism and chauvinism. Of  course, this is not what we emphasized when
writing up the paper, since otherwise we would never have been published by an
economics journal. Happily for us, interests also mattered, as indicated by the differ-
ential impact of  skills on attitudes across countries, but in fact these Heckscher–Ohlin
variables which we used to sell the papers to economists were a lot less important
quantitatively than either nationalism or chauvinism. Thus, being high-skilled
reduced the probability of  the most protectionist response by between 2.29 and 8.44
percentage points, depending on the income (and skill-endowment) of  the economy,
but moving chauvinism from the 20th to the 80th percentile increased the probability
of  the most protectionist response by nearly 20 percentage points (as compared with
a benchmark probability for that response of  some 31%).
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Now, some might respond that nationalism and chauvinism could be endogenous,
but gender surely is not, and our results found that the next most important influence
on attitudes towards trade is in fact gender. For example, being a woman increased
the probability of  the most protectionist response by 7.39 percentage points, a big
number. Why are women more anti-trade than men? Why are Latin American
women more anti-market in general than Latin American men (Graham and Pettinato,
2001, Table IV, p. 258)? Why, on the other hand, are women not systematically more
anti-immigrant than men, despite the fact that immigration and trade have similar
effects on income distribution in many trade models? And why are women significantly
less anti-refugee than men? I challenge anyone to find a rational choice explanation
for such findings, and I am pretty sure that ‘slow learning’ would not be my preferred
alternative. Apparently there exists a psychology literature on differences in moral
reasoning between men and women that might be relevant, but as an economist
I am permitted to remain unaware of  such things, even though they appear to be
potentially hugely important.
Back to slow learning. Even if, as indeed seems likely, preferences only evolve
slowly, then one still has to ask: ‘What do they evolve slowly from?’ And why should
the starting point have been different in France or in the United States? Here, if  the
promise of  this paper is to be fully fulfilled – and of  course I recognize that this is the
subject matter not for a journal article, but for a book – the authors will have to
engage deeply with the historical literature, for example with Eric Rauchway’s recent
argument that the peculiarities of  American political development can be traced back
to the particular way in which the US interacted with the 19th-century world econ-
omy: Rauchway, 2006). It is a striking feature of  this paper that its bibliography is
uniquely composed of  references to other economists, when one might have thought
that the work of  historians, political scientists, psychologists, and sundry others might
have been relevant as well. This is in no way a criticism of  the authors and the paper,
but it is a criticism of  modern economics: if  it wants to imperialistically invade other
people’s intellectual turf, it might occasionally take the time to listen to the natives,
who may have some helpful lessons to pass on about their local environment.
Furthermore, I am pretty sure that most historians would look askance on the
current fad in economics of  claiming that we can understand the role of  history in
explaining current beliefs, institutional structures or performance by running regres-
sions incorporating such crude variables as religious affiliation or ‘legal origin’, as is
done in Section 6. Never mind the fact that when you look in detail at the evolution
of  particular laws thought to matter for economic performance, such as bankruptcy
law, what you find is that such laws evolved very similarly throughout Europe during
the 19th century, no matter whether the country in question was Germanic, Latin or
Anglo-Saxon (Sgard, 2006); or that Weber’s thesis has at this stage been comprehen-
sively debunked by historians and social scientists. More fundamentally, I think most
historians would probably take the view that events are important in the long as well
as the short run. We are all familiar with the argument that German hostility to
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inflation arises from the experience of  hyperinflation after World War I, or that the
British obsession with exchange-rate policy can be traced back to the supposedly
damaging consequences of  sterling’s return to gold in the 1920s. Might not attitudes
towards capitalism also depend, not on the supposedly immutable cultural characteristics
of  populations, but on countries’ histories? This would of  course be more consistent
with the ‘slow learning’ hypothesis which is the main focus of  this paper.
I’d like to end with a suggestion. In favour of  the authors’ conclusions concerning
slow learning is the fact that, probably (because I don’t have the empirical evidence), big
policy shocks have indeed had large and long-lasting effects on attitudes. When Ryanair
was allowed to compete on the British–Irish air routes in the 1980s, this had an imme-
diate effect on airfares and passenger traffic, on what had previously been the most
expensive route per mile in the world. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this revolutionized
Irish attitudes towards competition. Another such example that might be relevant for
this paper is Mrs Thatcher’s selling off  council homes to tenants: did this (or the floating
of  national utilities) influence British people’s attitudes towards private property and
the profit motive? Could one look at such privatizations in countries where the market
subsequently rose, and see if  the impact on attitudes was different from countries in
which the market subsequently fell? Did the relative speed of  reform programmes in
different former Communist economies, in combination with those countries’ relative
successes, have durable effects on attitudes? I’ll bet there are substantial literatures on
at least some of  these questions, which might bolster the authors’ case. If  not, there
is a nice research agenda there for someone – possibly these authors? – to pursue.
Panel discussion
Luigi Guiso pointed out that the main question relates to the correlation between the
spread out of  capitalism and what people think about capitalism, and concerns
the direction of  causality. The debate dates back to Marx, who argued that it is the
structure of  the economy that leads to a cultural superstructure, and Max Weber, who
thought the opposite in his essays on the spirit of  capitalism. Overall, beliefs are
important and there are several reasons why we should be worried about them. As a
criticism of  the paper, he stressed that the debate is not really between rationality and
irrationality. Indeed, it is perfectly rational that people act according to their belief,
and if  they are taking into account well-being at the society level as well as at the
individual level, it simply means that they derive utility from several factors. Alan
Drazen pointed out that even if  attitudes drive actions, the real problem is that
reported feelings can very likely not be what determine the actual behaviour. He was
also critical about the authors’ claim that the result (in Table 2) that richer people
support competition more was surprising. Perhaps this simply reflects a view of  ‘com-
petition’ as something related to lower taxes. Christian Schultz wondered if  more
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competition can make countries wealthier, thus raising a concern about whether
there could be a reverse causality. Pierre-Yves Geoffard added that the rich may well
be in favour of  competition, depending however on age, that is, on the time horizon
over which competition can shape their life. Hans-Werner Sinn remarked that people
who have financial wealth can be in favour of  competition when the economy is
open. In rich countries workers suffer from competition from low-wage countries and
thus call for protectionism, while rich people get more returns on their wealth and
should benefit from competition. Finally, Georges de Ménil commented on what can
be learnt from the socialist transition. The way and speed people changed their
attitudes is not an example of  slow learning at all: despite the common prior that it
would have required decades for ex-communists to think in terms of  another system,
attitudes changed very quickly.
APPENDIX
Table A1. Sample statistics of  attitudes and socio-demographics
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